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DISCUSSION RESPONSE
Victor’s Justice, Contested
A Response to Gabriel Lentner
In his post, Gabriel Lentner argues that the ICC legitimizes 
and reproduces “victor’s justice” through its acceptance of 
Article 13(b) referrals from the Security Council. He takes 
issue with the legal nature of the referrals, in which he finds 
the legitimation of a double standard of international justice 
in the Rome Statute. He also sees a double standard in the 
referrals themselves. That is, the referrals under Article 13(b) 
are tailored to support, or at least conform to, the interests 
of Security Council members.
For Lentner, this is problematic because the Rome Statute 
thereby institutionalizes the very injustice that the ICC 
should ideally combat. Though the ICC’s goal is to bring equal 
criminal justice to the “international community,” the Rome 

Statute gives favored status to the P5 while they refuse to 
submit themselves to the Court’s scrutiny. What makes the 
arrangement unique is that the P5 need not win a war to 
create result-oriented, one-sided criminal justice, centered 
on actors in weak states—victor’s justice.
While Lentner focuses on a solution from an academic point 
of view, this response will focus on the institutions 
themselves – the Security Council, states, and the ICC – to 
show where struggles against the idea of victor’s justice have 
happened and where they are going.
Debates over UNSC Influence in the Rome 
Statute
The inclusion of the Security Council referral in Article 13(b)
does institutionalize victor’s justice through Security Council 
referrals, but in a managed form. The rest of Article 13 
provides ways for the ICC to assert jurisdiction without the 
Council’s consent. The Security Council can also defer 
investigations or prosecutions per Article 16, but each P5 
state is able to veto a possible deferral. And according to the 
preamble to the Rome Statute, the ICC should “contribute to 
the prevention of” “grave crimes [that] threaten the peace, 
security and well-being of the world.” The mandate of the 
Court complements and challenges that of the Security 
Council, and the provisions of the Statute allow the ICC 
some, at least de jure, independent space in which to work.
The Statute could have more fully subjected the Court to the 
Council. Recall that the debates regarding the Rome Statute 
took place within the United Nations, where the supremacy 
of the P5 in the Security Council is institutionally entrenched. 
In addition, the International Law Commission supported the 
creation of a permanent court that would lack jurisdiction 
over any matter “being dealt with” by the Security Council. 
Likewise, the United States hoped for a much stronger form 
of victor’s justice in which Americans would be triable only by 
U.S. consent.
Through the efforts of the Like-Minded Group of States and 
NGOs, a compromise was reached that allowed the Security 
Council to expand the jurisdiction of the Court beyond the 
nationals and territory of consenting states, but while 
generally preserving the legal independence of the Court. As 
Benedetti et al. note, the familiarity and limited purpose of 
the idea of a criminal court and the experiences of the ad hoc 
tribunals made a unified opposition to the American position 
effective.
Still, the desire for universality and enforceability gave the 
Americans and other P5 states room to negotiate important 
issues of jurisdiction. The compromise between the Court’s 
supporters and the Americans, Chinese, and Russians is 
reflected in Articles 12 and 13 of the Rome Statute. Though 
the Court may act without the express approval of the 
Security Council, jurisdiction is based on consent (through 
ratification or, as in Ukraine, with regard to a situation) or 
Security Council referral. This arrangement largely shields 
the P5 from the jurisdiction of the ICC; however, the 
conferral of jurisdiction based on the consent of the state 
where the alleged crime occurred at least introduces the 
legal possibility for the Court to investigate and perhaps 
indict even nationals of non-consenting P5 members, as the 
case of Ukraine demonstrates.
Victor’s Justice in the Referrals
The two Security Council referrals to reach the ICC thus far 
(UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) and UNSC Resolution 1970 
(2011)) do reflect and promote victor’s justice, but they also 
show the conflicted stance of the P5 toward the Court. They 
show how the P5 see the Court as a useful tool, but only if 
they can control it. The referrals allow the Security Council 
to target specific states, and even specific groups, while 
granting exclusive jurisdiction over the nationals of 
intervening states not party to the Rome Statute only to 
those intervening states. In other words, they prevent the 
Court from finding that any of their nationals might have 
committed crimes. They consume many of the Court’s 
limited resources without allowing the UN to supplement the 
Court financially, and they require no contribution to the 
success of the Court’s efforts in either situation. In the Darfur 
referral, for example, the US negotiated the “no UN funding” 
clause, recognition of “Article 98 agreements” (bilateral 
agreements in which states agreed not to surrender 
Americans to the Court), and a paragraph attempting to limit 
not only the ICC’s jurisdiction over non-nationals, but 
universal jurisdiction as well.
The referrals also reflect and reinforce geopolitical interests 
of the major powers. The referral of the Darfur situation, for 
example, shows that the Security Council members are 
willing to use the Court when convenient to ignore the 
possibility of using stronger measures, such as military force, 
to handle a situation. On the other hand, as Makau Mutua
writes, Resolution 1970 has been condemned as an attempt to 
legitimize the forceful ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.
Of course, the Court could do more to challenge the victor’s 
justice promoted by the referrals. Article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute is permissive, rather than mandatory, and the Court 
could better set the conditions under which it will accept 
Security Council referrals. (See Dapo Akande’s comments on 
David Kaye’s proposals here.) In particular, the Court should 
refuse to act where the Security Council has referred only a 
set of actors, rather than a situation delimited only by time 
and space.
Challenging Victor’s Justice
In recent years, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has been 
somewhat more willing to challenge the P5, despite their 
influence over the Court. The OTP’s strategy of seemingly 
ignoring the one-sided jurisdictional limits in the Libya 
referral is a legally questionable, but politically savvy way to 
affirm the Court’s mandate while asserting its commitment to 
equal justice within the Libyan situation. Its investigations 
into Afghanistan and Georgia challenge the UK, the US, and 
Russia in ways that will at least call attention to their 
determination that the Court should not function to 
prosecute their nationals. In addition, the Court’s acceptance 
of Palestinian membership and the situation there challenges 
the United States’ close ally, Israel. (See David Bosco’s 
comments here.)
These examinations and investigations show that the ICC is 
at least willing to use its moral authority to challenge the idea 
that nationals of powerful states should be immune from its 
scrutiny. Rather than accommodating the P5 in the hope of 
garnering universal support, the ICC is now challenging the 
P5 in the hope of normalizing the actions of the ICC in post-
conflict situations wherever it may legally act. Even if no 
trials result, and therefore a longer list of not practically 
triable indictees, the visible, good-faith effort by the Court to 
investigate, report, and indict will help it to challenge the 
notion that it is responsible for the victor’s justice of the P5.
While challenging the P5 can help to counter accusations 
from less powerful states that the ICC is characterized by 
victor’s justice, the ICC’s strategy has resulted in new 
accusations of bias. Russia, in particular, has argued that the 
investigation in Georgia still represents victor’s justice of a 
sort, even as it had supported the examination into the 2008 
war in South Ossetia. As Mark Karsten points out, the Court’s 
decision to investigate is intertwined with the Western 
narrative that Russia is an “aggressive” state. The Court, he 
argues, chose to make Russia the first P5 member subject to a 
full investigation based on Russian political isolation as much 
as on the realities of the South Ossetian War. For its part, 
Russia denies having been aggressive in Georgia and argues 
that the Court has “taken the aggressor’s side,” that of US-
backed Mikheil Saakashvili.
But victor’s justice still may lead to justice. From the victor’s 
justice of Nuremberg came the vocabulary to challenge the 
actions of even powerful warring states, as David Forsythe
points out. More recently, as David Bosco outlines, in the 
early years of the ICC, the United States had difficulty 
challenging the narrative of accountability offered by the 
Court’s supporters at least in part because of the hypocrisy of 
its own defense of sovereignty. The UK and France, 
themselves enmeshed in European Union politics, actually 
deflected US pressure from smaller European states, and 
promoted an accountability narrative that saw the US 
eventually lend tacit support to the Court with regard to 
Sudan and Libya.
Conclusion
Of course the insertion of the Security Council referral into 
the Rome Statute was victor’s justice, and of course the P5 
use that power in self-serving ways. However, the 
relationship between the Security Council and the ICC is not 
altogether determined by victor’s justice. The Security 
Council’s power to defer could be a powerful check on not 
just a rogue prosecutor, but on a Court focused so strongly 
on prosecuting criminals that it loses sight of the political 
costs. And the ICC—by promoting norms of accountability 
and equal justice, whether through its own agency or in 
concert with small and medium states—can provide an 
important foil to the politics of the Security Council.
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